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The test of  congruence under total evidence as used in systematics has been tied to a Popperian philosophy
of  science, but is here shown to be related to the coherence theory of  truth in metaphysics and thus to
coherentism in epistemology. Since the test of  congruence is coherentist, the contextual (theoretical) background
of  initial character conceptualization cannot be ignored as is suggested by some proponents of  the total
evidence approach. The relative merits of  a total evidence approach versus conditional data set partitioning
are considered, and whereas both have their merits and drawbacks, either approach requires causal grounding
of  character statements (statements of  homology), at least approximately and defeasibly. The conclusion is
that character congruence is a necessary, but not also a sufficient, condition for phylogeny reconstruction.
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discussions. This distinction concerns a ‘metaphysical
project’, as opposed to an ‘epistemological project’ (also
known as ‘justification project’: Kirkham, 2001). In its
most simple form, this distinction requires that
systematists separate what they believe history, or
phylogeny, to be or to have been (i.e., a unique and
irreversible process that occurs in the actual physical
world outside mind and discourse), from what they
believe to be justified or warranted to assert about this
process and the world in which it plays out (a specific
hypothesis of  relationships).
This distinction also has practical implications for
systematics. For example, proponents of  total evidence
have claimed that anything can be a potential character
hypothesis as long as there is a rigorous method of
testing such hypotheses: “There is no one operation
for determining character states in this system-it can
be anything that leads to the testable hypothesis of
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of  current debates concerning the
theory and practice of  systematics lie issues of
probabilification of that science as they relate to the
principle of  total evidence. History as it unfolded and
unfolds in the actual world is a unique process, and so
is phylogeny: some authors find that for this reason,
the probabilification of  phylogeny reconstruction is
inappropriate, as is the framing of  hypotheses of
phylogenetic relationships in probabilistic (likelihood)
terms (Kluge, 2001). The involvement of  probability
in maximum likelihood analysis, as well as in Bayesian
analysis of  phylogeny is evident, but its involvement
in cladistic parsimony analysis, in the principle of  total
evidence, and in the ‘test of  congruence’ is less obvious.
In this contribution I propose to clarify these issues by
drawing a distinction that is often neglected in relevant
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synapomorphy” (Kluge, 2003a: 356; emphasis added).
The test that is believed to discriminate between these
‘anythings’ is that of  congruence under parsimony, and
total evidence is believed to increase the severity of
the test (Kluge, 1997a, b, 2004). Griffiths (1999) put
the issue in even more explicit terms, not from a
(purportedly: Rieppel, 2003a) Popperian perspective,
however, but from a probabilistic one: “Cladistic
analysis can proceed from a list of  arbitrary measurements
by looking for congruence among the evolutionary
trees produced by different measurements and thus
‘bootstrapping’ itself  into a reliable character set”
(Griffiths, 1999: 225; emphasis added). The belief  is
“that any historical signal present in the data will
increase with the number of  characters scored, and
that this signal will override signals in the data present
from other forces” (Naylor & Adams, 2003: 864; see
also Rieppel & Kearney, 2002). Proponents of  the to-
tal evidence approach identify a “disturbing trend
towards data selectivity” (O’Leary et al., 2003: 861),
and cite Kluge (1997a) in support of  the notion that
inclusion of  all data, including all “published data,”
results in a stronger test of  phylogenetic relationships
(O’Leary et al., 2003: 862). In contrast, Naylor & Adams
(2003: 864) identify “the total evidence” and the
“‘relevant evidence’ schools of  thought,” where the
latter asserts that “careful choice of  characters is of
primary importance.” The central issue in such deba-
tes is about whether or not background theories (of
inheritance, development, function, and evolution)
should be brought to bear on character
conceptualizations. At least some proponents of  a to-
tal evidence approach eschew such theory-laden
character conceptualization because of  lack of  positive
knowledge (Kluge, 2003a; Grant & Kluge, 2004). But
as Ruse (1988: 60) pointed out: “As soon as one starts
breaking organisms into parts, one must bring in theory
… Take two bears, one white and one brown. Do they
differ in one feature, or does one take each hair
separately … The point is whether someone who
explicitly eschews the theory has the right to combine
all the hairs into one feature.” In fact, there cannot be
any theory-free character conceptualization, just as
there cannot be any theory-free observation (Popper,
1992; Hanson, 1961). To propose a putatively theory-
free approach to character conceptualization, as with
the famous punch-card approach to the automatic
scanning of  characters (Sneath & Sokal 1973, fig. 3-1),
is not to eschew theory, but to take a specific theoretical
stance instead, namely that the problem of  homology
can be dealt with by ignoring “details of  structure”
(Sneath & Sokal, 1973:87).
The Metaphysical and the Epistemic Projects
Metaphysics is the branch of  philosophy
concerned with issues of  reality and being, i.e., it is
concerned with the entities, their properties and their
relations that may or may not exist in the ‘real world
out there’. In contrast, epistemology is the branch of
philosophy concerned with the nature and extent of
human knowledge, i.e., it is concerned with how we
obtain knowledge, and how we can justify knowledge
claims about the ‘real world out there’. This is a much
weaker claim about knowledge than that made by the
metaphysical project.
In defense of  the total evidence school of
thought, Kluge (2004:206, emphasis added) raised
metaphysical concerns: “Although epistemology may
be what drives progress in science, the ontological status
of  what is being inferred cannot be ignored. Consider
that monophyletic parts of  phylogeny are necessarily
unique … as is the character evidence that is used in
the inference of  such things … and whatever position
is taken in discussions of  epistemology, it must be
consistent with that ontology.” This statement seems
confused, or confusing, at several levels.
First, the use of the expression ‘necessarily unique’
invokes a modal context, i.e., the question whether the
world could be in a different state from the actual one
in which a process of  phylogeny could have had
different results from those in the actual world. Given
the radical contingency of  the evolutionary process
(Kitcher, 1993), such could certainly be the case. To
use Quine’s (2001a) famous example: in our actual
world, the expressions ‘creatures with a heart’ and
‘creatures with kidneys’ are co-extensive, i.e., they refer
to the same set of  organisms (which, for the purpose
of  this example, are the vertebrates). According to
Kluge (2004), that ‘part’ of  the phylogeny, i.e.,
Vertebrata, is necessarily unique. However, it is
(logically) not impossible that the world could be in a
state different from the actual one, in which evolution
would have produced creatures with a heart but without
kidneys, or vice versa (Lewis, 2002). The world might
have been in a state where an evolutionary process
would not have resulted in a taxon Vertebrata as we
know it in the actual world, or it could be in a state in
which no evolution occurs at all. Conversely, one may
ask what it is that would make Vertebrata necessarily
unique, i.e., what property would Vertebrata have to
share necessarily relative to all possible world states?
Properties such as having a heart or having kidneys
will not do the work. The only property that Vertebrata
share necessarily relative to all possible world states is
a single common evolutionary (monophyletic) origin.
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On that account, the common evolutionary origin
becomes an essential property of  Vertebrata, albeit an
historical essence (LaPorte, 2004:176, n.4; 184, n.3; this
is the so-called ‘origin essentialism’: Hanna & Harrison,
2004:280). This, however, is a metaphysical position
that is quite different from the problem of  how we
discover a taxon Vertebrata, which is an epistemic
question.
Second, Kluge (2004) stipulates a specific
ontology, i.e., that parts of  the phylogenetic nexus are
particulars, as are the characters on the basis of  which
this phylogeny is inferred (Grant & Kluge, 2004), and
then requests that epistemology follows this lead. But
the thesis that taxa (‘Vertebrata’), or homologues (the
‘vertebrate heart’), are particulars (‘things’) is certainly
debatable (Rieppel, 2004a). Furthermore, ontological
categories are not the kind of  things we expect to bump
into as we travel the world (Luntley, 1999:117). The
idea that ontological commitments may flow from
scientific theories has been argued by Quine (2001b;
‘what is in the world is what is in our theories about
the world’: Gibson, 1982) and criticized by T.S. Kuhn
(1974; see discussion in Rieppel, 2005). For Quine, a
scientific theory makes ontological commitments to
the extent that it specifies which objects must exist for
the theory to be true. But a scientific theory is issued
as a set of  (theoretical) sentences, and Quine in parti-
cular insisted on the idea that there may be various
ways in which to interpret sentences and their
constituent parts. The result is an ontological relativism
(Hylton, 2004), such that ontology is certainly the
wrong place to start epistemology.
Third, Kluge (2004) fails to demonstrate how the
‘total evidence approach’ is epistemologically superior
to the ‘relevant evidence approach’ in recovering the
phylogeny, if  taxa and homologues are conceptualized
as particulars as he requests (see Mahner & Bunge,
1997, for a recent critique of  ‘bio-nominalism’). To
fully understand the issues at stake in the discussion
of  the total evidence approach to phylogeny
reconstruction it is important to clearly distinguish the
metaphysical from the epistemological project, i.e., to
distinguish words (that make claims about objects) from
objects themselves. Organisms and their parts, fossil
or extant, are objects (things, bodies, particulars): the
heart of  a guinea pig can be laid out on a dissection
table, as can the femur of  a T. rex. But a statement
issued by a systematist, such as ‘all vertebrates have a
heart’ is not an object. It is a sentence that expresses a
proposition about objects and their parts. Systematists
talk about characters, and code those in a data matrix.
But the symbols that fill a data matrix are not objects.
Instead, they stand for (are abbreviations of) sentences,
i.e., character statements, and it is those character
statements that issue propositions about objects
(specimens) and their parts (see Rieppel, 2004b, for
further discussion). To be true, false, or at least
justifiable, these character statements must somehow
relate to the objects that can be laid out on a dissection
table. How such a relation is to be established, or
justified, are issues discussed by metaphysicians and
epistemologists.
The Coherence Theory of  Truth
In the context of  the metaphysical project, two
classic theories of  truth have been identified as age-
old competitors (see the account in Kirkham, 2001),
viz. the ‘correspondence theory of  truth’ as opposed
to the ‘coherence theory of  truth’. In the context of
the epistemological project, the correspondence theory
of  truth translates into ‘foundationalism’, the coherence
theory into ‘coherentism’ respectively. The
correspondence theory of  truth has traditionally been
associated with a realist, the coherence theory with an
idealist perspective.
Realism postulates a world outside mind and
discourse. From a realist perspective, sentences have
truth conditions, “which obtain independently of  our
recognition of  their truth-values” (Dummett,
1981:451). The truth condition of  a sentence is the
condition the world must be in for a sentence about
the world to be true or false. The truth-value of  a
sentence is its truth or falsity relative to the condition
the world is in. To establish the truth-value of  a
sentence (it being true or false) in empirical science
must rely on some sort of  correspondence relation
between what is said about the world of  physical objects
and that world. But words remain forever separated
from objects by a logical (Körner, 1970), i.e., conceptual
(Luntley, 1999) gap (see Rieppel, 2004b, for further
discussion). This is why realist philosophers today
request a causal grounding of  words in the world of
objects. It is the relation of  hypothetical cause and
observed effect that ties empirical theories to the
physical world. This ultimately leads from the
metaphysical notion of  truth to the epistemic notion
of  justifiability.
In contrast, the coherence theory of  truth is
historically linked to idealism, which rejects
correspondence relations between words and things
as a condition for truth. Instead, the nature of  truth
consists in the coherence of a belief with a designated
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set of  beliefs (where knowledge is defined as ‘justified
true belief ’). In its most perfect, in fact ideal (Lynch,
2001), conception, a coherent system would be: i)
comprehensive, i.e., account for all ‘known facts’
(incorporate the total evidence available), and ii)
deductively inferential. In Blanshard’s (2001:108) terms,
“every proposition would be entailed by the others
jointly, and even singly” in such a system, in which
“the integration would be so complete that no part
could be seen for what it was without seeing its relation
to the whole, and the whole itself  could be understood
only through the contribution of  every part”
(Blanshard, 2001:108). Hennig (1966:129) adopted a
coherence theory of  truth: “That an assumption is true
is shown by its ‘confirmation’ within the thought
relationship, inasmuch as it not only does not contradict
it but fits into it.” Hennig (1950, 1966) based the
integration of  this system of  thought on his principle
of  reciprocal illumination (see further discussion in
Rieppel, 2003b).
As will be discussed in greater detail below,
coherence is indeed a necessary condition for truth
for both coherentists and foundationalists, but –
according to the latter – not also a sufficient condition.
Blanshard (2001:107), the most prominent early de-
fender of  the coherence theory of  truth, recognized
that the term ‘coherence’ may be used in a weaker, or
stronger, sense. In the present context, the weak sense
of coherence means simply consistency: a proposition
coheres with a set of other propositions if it is
consistent with all the other members of  the set. The
strong sense of  coherence would be deductive
entailment. For example, my belief  that the streets will
be wet tonight (Q) can be justified by its coherence
with two other beliefs I hold (Sosa, 2000:137), i.e., that
it is now raining (P), and that (everywhere and at all
times) if  it rains, then the streets get wet (P ⊃ Q). The
relation of  entailment is [(P ⊃ Q), P ∴ Q], i.e.,
justification is by modus ponens.
To speak of  coherence of  character statements
in modern systematics is to speak of  their consistency
(Kluge & Farris, 1969), i.e., to use coherence in its weak
sense, not in the sense of  deductive entailment (contra
Kluge, 2003b).
The Concept of  ‘Total Evidence’
Introducing the concept of  ‘total evidence’ in
systematics, Kluge (1989) cited the relevant theoretical
background, namely the work on inductive inference
and its relevance for epistemology by the philosophers
Rudolf  Carnap and Carl Hempel. Consulting the
references provided by Kluge (1989) of  Carnap (1950)
and Hempel (1965) shows that for these authors, the
principle of  ‘total evidence’ was tied to inductive
inference, which is always probabilistic. Carnap (1995)
and Hempel (2001) invoked ‘logical’ or ‘inductive
probability’ (the two terms being synonymous: see
Rieppel, 2003a, b, for a discussion) as a measure for
the degree to which an inductive inference is implied
by its premises (a sentence follows inductively from a
premise if  it is true under some of  the conditions under
which the premise is also true; logical probability can
of  course also be invoked in a deductive context).
Logical probability thus translates into the (inductive)
degree of  confirmation of  a hypothesis or theory, and
that ‘logical probability’ had to be based on the total
evidence available at the time. ‘Total evidence’ is thus
a classic principle of  inductive inference (e.g., Fitzhugh
1997; contra Kluge, 1997a, b, 2003a, b, 2004).
The empiricist philosopher Rudolf  Carnap (see
Carnap 1997a, b, for an accessible discussion) used ‘to-
tal evidence’ as a tool of decision-making, where the
decision is to accept or reject a certain theory/
hypothesis on inductive grounds. ‘Total evidence’
supports this process of  decision-making by
determining, in part, the value of  a ‘c-function,’ which
is the ‘degree of  confirmation’ (synonymous with
‘logical probability’: see Rieppel 2003a; Lecointre &
Deleporte 2004). At Carnap’s hands, ‘degree of
confirmation’ was also supposed to impact on a
psychological function, which is the ‘degree of
credence’ a subject is willing to bestow on a theory. So
‘total evidence’ also supports the process of  decision
making when it comes to the performance of  an
intentional act on the basis of  the acceptance, or
rejection, of  a certain hypothesis/theory (e.g., building
an aircraft on the basis of the theories of
aerodynamics). This ‘total evidence’ for Carnap
(1997b:972; emphasis added) comprised the “total
observational knowledge” available to a person at the time
of  decision-making. That raises a number of  issues
(see further discussion in Rieppel, 2003b), most
prominently the role of  background knowledge
(Lecointre & Deleporte, 2004) in establishing ‘relevant’
versus ‘irrelevant’ evidence (see the discussion in Haack,
1998), and in particular the discrepancy between the
total evidence possessed at any given point in time,
and the total evidence that could potentially be brought
to bear on a hypothesis at some time in the future. If
the gap between possessed evidence (total available
evidence) and potential evidence (total evidence)
cannot be estimated, then the logical probability and,
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with it, the degree of  confirmation, will be
compromised (Goodman, 2001). If  this gap cannot
be estimated, or closed, then why should we not stop
research with the first piece of  confirming evidence,
why should we look for additional confirming evidence,
and for how long should we do so to increase the degree
of  confirmation (logical probability) of  a theory?
Early cladists emphasized ‘uniquely shared
derived characters’, just as Hennig (1950) emphasized
that a single synapomorphy may be good enough to
support a hypothesis of  monophyly. “‘Hennig’s
Principle’” says that “the presence of  a shared derived
character allows to infer closest relationships – but it
must be made clear that this is true only of  those shared
characters, which cannot be thought of  as having
evolved several times independently” (Schlee, 1971:12),
Accordingly, and to give an example, Patterson
(1973:235) concluded: “… there are several shared
specializations of  Amia and teleosts which are shown
by the fossil record to have been acquired in parallel:
some of  these are unique, and therefore evidence of
relationship, but others are more widespread.” The
point here made is that the a priori probability for a
unique specialization to be evidence of kinship is
greater than for characters that are more widely
distributed. Only later did cladists shift towards
maximizing the character evidence at the cost of  (some
degree of) homoplasy (Hennig, 1966; Farris, 1983;
Kluge, 1989).
In systematics, the total evidence is the sum of
all character statements available at the time. This
includes, of  course, not only new characters that result
from continuing analysis, but also old characters that
are part of  the background knowledge. However, given
different background knowledge, individual researchers
may differ in what they accept as ‘relevant’ total
evidence (Haack, 1998; for examples see Rieppel &
Kearney, 2002). The total evidence confirms (supports),
or disconfirms, hypotheses of  relationships in terms
of  degrees of  ‘congruence’, i.e., degrees of  internal
consistency, or coherence within and between sets and
subsets of  character statements. Systematists typically
talk about ‘congruent’ characters, but what they really
mean by that is the coherence of  sets and subsets of
character statements relative to an inclusive hierarchy
(Patterson, 1982). More precisely: character statements
predicate properties of  organisms, such that coherence
of  sets and subsets of  character statements translates
into a congruent hierarchy of  groups within groups.
To the degree that the properties predicated by the
character statements are natural ones (i.e., embedded
in a process of  cause and effect, such as inheritance
from a common ancestor), the congruent hierarchy
of  groups within groups will also be a natural one
(Rieppel, 2004a)
But coherence of  sets and subsets of  character
statements typically comes in degrees, i.e., there
typically are one or several character statements that
conflict with the hierarchy of  groups within groups
marked out by those character statements that are
coherent to the largest degree. But this means that
hypotheses of  relationships based on degrees of
coherence of  character statements will be more or less
probable. A greater degree of  coherence among
character statements bestows a greater degree of
probability on a hypothesis of  monophyly (Rieppel,
1988:166).
Is the ‘Test of  Congruence’ a Popperian Test?
Kluge (2004) acknowledged that Hempel
(1965:64) used total evidence as the “basis for
determining the degree of  confirmation” of  a theory/
hypothesis, but he insisted on his “own logic” (Kluge,
2004:205), which he cast in terms of  “justification” of,
and “support” for, phylogenetic conclusions.
Somewhat inconsistently, Kluge (2004) continued to
insist that he (later) wedded the maxim of  ‘total
evidence’ to the Popperian concepts of  ‘explanatory
power’ (Farris, 1983), ‘severity of  test’ and ‘degree of
corroboration.’ I will here argue that such cannot be
done without severe distortion of  Popper’s philosophy
of  science.
Kluge’s (1997a, b, 2003a, b, 2004) adoption of  a
Popperian, i.e., ‘falsificationist’ approach to systematics
is crucial for his claim that “there is no one operation
for determining character states in this system-it can
be anything that leads to the testable hypothesis of
synapomorphy” (Kluge 2003a:356; emphasis added).
This is a putatively theory-free approach to character
conceptualization, which is patterned on Popper’s idea
that the origin of  a theory/hypothesis is irrelevant as
long as this theory/hypothesis can be tested, and
potentially refuted. With this claim, Popper looked back
on Kant, for he conceded coming close to Kant’s
conundrum (Popper, 1979:315). How could Kant
dismiss the ‘thing-in-itself ’ as an object of  rational
cognition, without some implicit knowledge of  what
this ‘thing-in-itself ’ is? But Popper was not positing
‘things’ (Popper, 1988:116), he was positing theories,
hypotheses, ideas. True, he wanted these theories to be
applicable to ‘things’, but that says nothing about the
‘things-in-themselves’, it only says something about
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how well our theories perform in our own world of
experience. As Kuhn (1974:2) put it: “… the aim is to
invent theories that explain observed phenomena and
to do so in terms of  real objects, whatever the latter
phrase may mean.” In a similar sense, Kluge (2003a, b,
2004) can be interpreted to treat character statements
as hypotheses the origin of  which is irrelevant as long
as they can be tested and potentially falsified. This
argument will work only if  the test invoked by Kluge
is of  a similar nature as the test invoked by Popper,
however.
Popper (1983, 1989, 1992) is famous for having
championed the hypothetico-deductive approach to
scientific explanation. This requires that a testable
prediction be deducible from a theory/hypothesis and
its auxiliaries, but it fails to explain how we get a theory/
hypothesis and its auxiliaries in the first place (Lipton,
2004). Even so, and according to Popper, if  a prediction
passes the test, the theory is corroborated; if  it fails
the test, the theory is falsified. In empirical sciences,
predictions are usually issued in terms of  observation
statements, where observations may or may not have
to be mediated by instruments. However, Popper’s
earliest claim to fame was his insight (Popper, 1979,
1992) that all observation statements are “soaked in
theory” (Popper, 1989:387). For this reason, Popper
had to take recourse to conventionalism, which
emphasizes the importance of  ‘decision making’ in
science (compare Carnap’s use of  total evidence in
support of  such decision making). For Popper,
therefore, it is the acceptance of  an observation statement
in a ‘court of  scientific opinion’ (Popper, 1992) that
results in the corroboration, or falsification, of  a theory.
It is for this reason that, according to Popper, a theory
that has been accepted as being (logically) falsified
needs not also to be rejected in practice (an argument
exploited by Farris, 1983).
Given Popper’s adherence to hypothetico-
deductivism, the deduction of  testable predictions from
theory for him was the hallmark of  ‘THE scientific
method’, i.e., the criterion by which to demarcate
science from metaphysics (for an account of  the legend
of  ‘THE scientific method’ see Kitcher, 1993). With
his falsifiability criterion, Popper found himself  in
opposition to those logical empiricists who championed
a verifiability criterion by which to demarcate science
from metaphysics. Verificationism also appeals to
testing procedures (e.g., Friedman, 1999:150).
According to Schlick (1959:86) for example, “it is
simply impossible to give the meaning of  any statement
except by describing the fact which must exist if  the
statement is to be true. If  it does not exist, then the
statement is false.” So the same fact can symmetrically
confirm a statement (if  it exists), or disconfirm a
statement (if  it does not exist). Popper turned this
symmetry of  confirmation and disconfirmation into
an asymmetry of  falsification. If  a prediction deduced
from theory is met by experience, it does not confirm
the theory, it only corroborates it. If  the prediction is
not met, or rather, if  it is accepted that the prediction
is not met, falsification of  the theory occurs. It is
evident that no such asymmetry of  falsification obtains
in the ‘test of  congruence’ based on total evidence.
Congruent characters (coherent character statements)
confirm a hypothesis of  relationships to the degree
that incongruent characters disconfirm it symmetrically.
This is the relationship expressed in the ensemble
consistency index (or tree length).
Kluge (2004) tied the use of  total evidence in
phylogeny reconstruction to Popper’s concept of
‘degree of  corroboration’. But Popper’s concept of
corroboration is not one of  confirmation. It does not
make promises as to the future performance of  a theory
(Rieppel, 2003a). Degree of  corroboration is merely
an exhaustive list of  the historical incidences of  the
number and kinds of  tests a theory has passed. For
David Hume, the future success of  induction gains
nothing form its past success: the mere fact that the
sun has risen every morning ever since mankind
populated the earth (and before) does not guarantee
it’s rising tomorrow (Popper invoked Russell’s turkey,
who after months of  being well fed expected food on
Christmas day when instead his head was cut off). In a
similar sense, the future success of  a theory gains
nothing from its past corroboration. Instead, a
dedicated Popperian will seek ways to falsify the most
interesting theories, but these are also the most highly
corroborated ones. In tying the concept of  ‘degree of
corroboration’ to phylogenetic analysis, Kluge (2004)
did not raise the issue of  the ‘future performance’ of
phylogenetic hypotheses, but the question of  the
predictive (explanatory) power of  such hypotheses is
nevertheless an important one. To imply that
phylogenetic hypotheses have no predictive power
(which is not an implication made by Kluge, 2004)
would mean to acknowledge that the relative empirical
content (sensu Popper) of  a hypothesis of  relationships
is zero (see Rieppel, 2003a).
Degree of  corroboration increases with severity
of  test, another Popperian notion linked to the principle
of  total evidence by Kluge (2004). The severity of  test,
and with it the degree of  corroboration, increases the
riskier the prediction is that is put to test given the
current background knowledge. In other words, the
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more a prediction transcends current background
knowledge, the more severe is the test, and the higher
the degree of  corroboration if  the prediction passes
the test (Rieppel, 2003a). Cladists have contemplated
Popper’s concept of  ‘degree of  corroboration in terms
of  his formula: C(h, e, b) = p(e, hb) – p(e, b). The term
p(e, hb) is Fisher’s likelihood function relativized to
background knowledge, which expresses the probability
a hypothesis h conveys on the evidence e given
background knowledge b. But in the context of
hypothetico-deductivism, e stands to h in the relation
of  logical entailment (Rieppel, 2003a), such that the
likelihood of  e comes out as 1 (Lipton, 2004). Popper’s
formalism can thus be re-written as C(h, e, b) = 1 – p(e,
b), which means that the degree of  corroboration
increases with the improbability of  e given the current
background knowledge (Faith & Trueman, 2001).
Considerations about the degree of
corroboration thus lead to the distinction of  the
prediction of  data versus the accommodation of  data
by theory (Lipton, 2004). An inductivist will ask the
question what degree of  confirmation the total
evidence available at the time will confer upon a theory/
hypothesis? In light of  this question it seems
unimportant whether the evidence became available
before, or only after the theory was formulated. Under
Carnap’s predicament, evidence was related to a
hypothesis in terms of  ‘inductive’, i.e., ‘logical’
probability, but such ‘logical probability’ cannot depend
on the merely historical fact that data were or became
available before or after the theory was proposed. This
is in accordance with the total evidence approach in
systematics, where severity of  test (Kluge, 1997a) is
said to increase if  all available evidence, including the
previously “published data” (O’Leary et al., 2003:862),
are included in the analysis. This means that the test
of  congruence under total evidence accommodates
both old and new evidence.
Such a conclusion did not seem acceptable to
Popper. For him, it was all too easy to formulate a theory
that would accommodate previously available evidence.
What he asked for (Popper, 1989) were bold, new
predictions that significantly transcend the given
background knowledge, putting the theory at its
maximal possible risk. Significantly, Popper invoked
‘total evidence’ only in formulating his own positive
solution, i.e., his own definition of  ‘degree of
cornfirmation’, and in that context he asked for a
subdivision of  total evidence: “That is to say, the total
evidence e is to be partitioned into y and z; and y and z
should be so chosen as to give c(x, y, z) the highest
value possible for x, on the available total evidence”
(Popper, 1997:222, n.82; see also Popper, 1989:288; and
Rieppel, 2003a, for a discussion). In this context, z is
the given background knowledge that includes old
evidence, whereas y is the new evidence (the new
observational results excluded from z: Popper,
1989:288), and x is the new explanatory hypothesis.
According to Popper, it is the new evidence that confers
the greatest degree of  confirmation on a new
explanatory hypothesis, not the old evidence relegated
to background knowledge (for further analysis of  this
claim see Lipton, 2004). Systematists pursuing a total
evidence approach evidently do not honor Popper’s
methodological requirement of  subdividing the total
evidence into old and new one.
Finally, there is the concept of  the ‘test’ itself:
the claim in a Popperian context that total evidence
increases severity of  test, and thus the degree of
corroboration, in phylogeny reconstruction must be
based on a notion of  ‘test’ that is on par with Popper’s.
But such is not the case. Popper (1983) adopted a realist
perspective, where “a correspondence theory of  truth
is the natural semantic side salad to a realist
metaphysics” (Devitt & Sterelny 1999:252). Popper
(1983:80) proclaimed “I believe in metaphysical
realism,” and hence concluded “a statement is true if  and
only if  it corresponds to the facts” (Popper, 1973:46). But as
explained above, words remain separated from objects
by a logical (conceptual) gap, plus ‘facts’ are not objects,
but rather complexes construed out of  objects, their
properties and their relations. What is required is a
causal grounding of  theories in the world of  objects,
such that prediction and test engage scientists in a causal
(in Popper’s case: experimental) interaction with the
world of  objects. This was, indeed, Popper’s
requirement: “… if  you kick a rock hard enough, you
will feel it can kick back” (Popper, 1988:116).
The test of  congruence, whether or not under
total evidence, does not engage the systematist in a
causal interaction with the world of  objects, however.
Instead, it tests for logical relations between character
statements, i.e., their coherence or lack thereof  relative
to a hierarchy. The test of  congruence therefore is not
a Popperian test, but is rooted in coherentism instead:
“we test judgements by the amount of  coherence which
in that particular subject matter it seems reasonable to
expect” (Blanshard, 2001:108). Because congruence
tests logical relations between character statements only,
not their causal grounding in the world of  objects (in
theories of  inheritance, development, function, and
evolution), it is not permissible to neglect the origin
of  character statements as Popper (mistakenly: Lipton,
2004) believed he could do with respect to theories
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that can be put to test in an experimental setup.
Character statements are propositions about putative
homology (primary homology statements sensu
dePinna, 1991), but that requires that the shared
characters are putatively tied into some causal process,
such as inheritance from a common ancestor. Because
the test of  congruence does not address problems of
causal grounding, anything (Kluge, 2003a) can indeed
be subjected to it in search for some reasonable amount
of  congruence (coherence of  character statements
relative to a hierarchy), but the congruent system so
obtained will remain ‘hanging in the air.’ Again, the
argument is that coherence is a necessary condition of
truth, but not a sufficient one also.
Griffiths’ More Sophisticated Approach
According to Kluge (2003a), ‘anything’ can be a
putative character, provided that there is a method that
allows to test, and potentially refute, the corresponding
character statements, where total evidence is said to
increase the severity of  test. However, the test of
congruence tests for coherence and incoherence of
character statements relative to a hierarchy only, yet
coherence or incoherence of  character statements are
logical relations between sentences, not historical
relations between organisms or their parts. This
procedure therefore misses the requirement of causal
grounding of  character statements. As long as some
degree of  coherence is obtained, a hierarchy will result
form the test of  congruence. But without causal
grounding of  the character statements in theories of
inheritance, development, and/or functional anatomy,
no distinction seems possible between a natural, as
opposed to an artificial hierarchy. Against this
background, Griffiths’ (1999:225; emphasis added)
claim seems even more provocative: “cladistic analysis
can proceed from a list of  arbitrary measurements by
looking for congruence among the evolutionary trees
produced by different measurements and thus
‘bootstrapping’ itself  into a reliable character set.” Upon
closer inspection, however, his claim is revealed to be
more sophisticated instead.
As was done by Kluge (2003a), Griffiths (1999)
again neglects the contextual background of  character
conceptualization in that he even admits ‘arbitrary
measurements’ into phylogenetic analysis based on
congruence. But he does not advocate a total evidence
approach! Instead, he asks for congruence amongst
cladograms obtained from different sets of  such
arbitrary measurements. The idea here is that if  enough
such measurements are involved, and if  a high degree
of  congruence of  trees obtains that result from
different sets of  such measurements, then such
congruence of  trees cannot be due to chance alone.
According to Hempel (1965:146), a ‘natural’
classification is distinguished from an ‘artificial’ one
by the fact that “those characteristics of  the elements
which serve as criteria of  membership in a given class
are associated, universally or with a high probability,
with more or less extensive clusters of  other
characteristics.” This is the criterion of  coherence,
which Whewell in 1840 applied to repeated patterns
as follows: “The Maxim by which all Systems professing
to be natural must be tested is this: – that the arrangement
obtained from one set of  characters coincides with the arrangement
obtained from another set” (cited by Ruse, 1988:54; italics
in the original). In cladistics, this procedure is known
as ‘taxonomic congruence’, the classic competitor to
the total evidence approach (see discussion in Rieppel
& Grande, 1994).
What is believed to do the work in marking out a
natural hierarchy based on taxonomic congruence is
the “synergistic power of  evidence” (Lipton, 2004:204),
a principle that goes back to John Stuart Mill. Such an
approach acknowledges that evidence is never certain,
but stipulates that the confidence in the inferred
phylogeny increases with an increasing number of
characters partitioned into an increasing number of
character sets that yield congruent trees. The arguments
against the causal grounding of  character statements
capitalize on the fact that such causal grounding can
never be certain (O’Leary et al., 2003; see Rieppel &
Kearney, 2002, for a discussion). For example, similarity
of  an ontogenetic trajectory can support a hypothesis
of  homology, but dissimilarity of  ontogeny cannot
refute a hypothesis of  homology, for ontogenetic
trajectories are themselves subject to evolutionary
transformation. Griffiths’ (1999) argument therefore
emphasizes not a causal grounding of  character
statements, but congruence (or consilience) amongst
trees resulting from different sets of  character
statements deployed in sufficient numbers: “consilience
is like a quarrel or a tango. You must have at least two
parties” (Ruse, 1987:239). “There are different ways
of  breaking organisms into groups,” and if  they coin-
cide, “you are inclined to think that there’s more than
mere chance at work … Such coming together, could
not be mere coincidence” (Ruse, 1987:238).
Griffiths (1999) argument is more sophisticated
than the total evidence approach, and has something
going for it in particular where molecular data are
involved, whose alignment may involve some
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arbitrariness (alignment on the basis of parsimony as
argued by Wheeler, 1998, chooses the conventional
principle of  simplicity as basis for alignment, a choice
that is essentially arbitrary). Molecular data have the
potential to come in large numbers, and their
subdivision into different data sets may simply reflect
the different genes sequenced. But beyond such
pragmatic considerations, there remain well-known
theoretical arguments against such a procedure: how
many characters are enough, and what is the theoretical
basis on which to subdivide characters into different
data sets (see Rieppel & Grande,1994, for further
discussion). Conditional data set partitioning seems
superior to total evidence (simultaneous analysis: Nixon
& Carpenter, 1996) in that is exploits the ‘synergistic
power of  evidence’ (Lecointre & Deleporte 2004;
Rieppel, 2004b); it is inferior to total evidence in that
it misses hidden support or conflict (Gatesy et al., 1999).
The best pragmatic solution therefore is to pursue both
strategies (the ‘global congruence’ of  Levasseur &
Lapointe, 2001). Better still is to pursue both strategies
in conjunction with an attempt to causally ground
character statements, even if  the latter can be achieved
only partially, or defeasibly so (i.e., if  it can go wrong).
Why the Causal Grounding of  Character
Statements is Important
In the context of  the metaphysical project, a
coherence theory of  truth explains the nature of  truth
as the coherence relation within a most encompassing
set of  propositions (judgments, beliefs). In the context
of  the epistemological project, a knowledge claim (such
as a claim about homology as indicator of  phylogenetic
relationships) is justified by its coherence with all or
with a majority of  other such claims. This is why
coherentists tend towards holism, of  which the total
evidence approach is one aspect. On the coherence
theory of  truth, a proposition is true if  it coheres with
a designated set of  other propositions. Such a theory
must fail in the abstract, since “virtually any proposition
can be fitted into some coherent set” (Walker,
2001:125). Walker (2001) objected to that criticism and
pointed out that the coherence theory of  truth pertains
to beliefs that are actually and sincerely held, or would
so be held under appropriate circumstances. But as
Walker (2001) and others (Kirkham, 2001) noted, this
only leads into an infinite regress. The truth that
proposition P is actually held (or would be held under
the appropriate circumstances) “consists in its own
coherence with the system of  beliefs. It cannot be a
fact, independent of  that system, that [P] is held. If  it
were, the truth that [P] is held would be a truth that
did not consist in coherence” (Walker, 2001:147).
The same problem obtains for morphology based
systematics in the context of  the epistemic project,
since if  ‘anything’ can pass as a character (Kluge,
2003a), any character statement can in principle be
made to cohere with any other character statements
simply by its appropriate definition (Rieppel & Kearney,
2002). The same can apply to molecular sequence data
if  appropriate ‘fudging’ of  alignment is permitted. As
a consequence, the statement ‘character statement P
coheres with the designated set’ can be true only if
that very statement itself  coheres with the designated
set, such that “‘character statement P coheres with the
designated set’ coheres with the designated set,” etc.
ad infinitum (Kirkham, 2001:115). The coherence theory
of  truth and with it epistemic coherentism therefore
lead to an infinite regress, unless it is accepted that at
some meta- (or meta-meta-meta- etc.) level a
proposition (belief, judgment) is accepted to be true
by coherence with a mind-independent fact (Kirkham,
2001:115), at which point we “would no longer have a
pure coherence theory of  truth” (Walker, 2001:147).
This explains the initial implausibility of  the coherence
theory as a metaphysical project if  perceived from the
perspective of  empirical science, for it is intuitively
implausible that truth should obtain from the mere
relation of  coherence between truth-bearers (such as
propositions), as opposed to their relation to the world
(Kirkham, 2001:111).
As noted by Kirkham (2001:104), “many
defenders of  coherence theory, if  they were made
aware of  the distinction, … would identify the
justification [i.e., epistemological] project as the one
they intend their theories to satisfy.” Systematists are
well aware that coherence of  character statements is
almost universally imperfect. Character statements will
generally not come out as fully coherent relative to a
hierarchy; there generally will be at least some degree
of  inconsistency or incoherence (incongruence,
homoplasy). However, if  there are two sets of
propositions (e.g., two sets of  character statements)
that are coherent within themselves, but incoherent
between themselves, then coherence alone cannot offer
any criterion of  choice between these sets of  beliefs
or propositions in terms of  how well they approximate
the world of  objects, their natural properties and their
causal relations. If  two sets of  data that are congruent
within but incongruent between them mark out
different hierarchies of  the same organisms, then they
will be seen to support two different hypotheses of
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phylogeny. Again, congruence (coherence of  character
statements) alone cannot offer a criterion of  choice
between these two hierarchies in terms of  their
naturalness. The only way to resolve the conflict seems
to be to put the two data sets together in a simultaneous
analysis (Nixon & Carpenter, 1996), i.e., to apply the
principle of  total evidence (Kluge, 1989). This is why
the ideal system built on coherence will take into
account all ‘known facts’, i.e., the total evidence
available (Lynch, 2001:99). In sum, to test for character
congruence (coherence of  character statements) is a
necessary condition for systematics, but it is not also a
sufficient condition. Just as Popper will have to concede
to coherentism that the theory and the appropriate test
statement must cohere if  any relevant testing is to occur
(Audi, 2003), it has to be acknowledged that incoherent
talk about the world does not make much sense, not in
systematics, nor in any other domain of  discourse. But
beyond that, empirical science requires that its theories
and explanations be well aligned with the causal
structure of  the world (Boyd, 1999).
It is important to realize that incoherence
(incongruence) can undermine a particular knowledge
claim, such as a particular (preferred) hypothesis of
relationships, but that this does not mean that mere
coherence suffices to justify a particular knowledge
claim (Audi, 2003:204). This is essentially the insight
of  Farris (1983; see also Kluge, 2001, 2003a, b) who
claimed that incongruence can undermine cladograms
(the falsificationist program), but that congruence does
not support a phylogenetic hypothesis, for the
congruent characters need not be homologous, they
could also be homoplastic (parallel; but see Wilkinson,
1991). One can think of  the sum of  all characters over
the sum of  all taxa relative to the finite number of
possible hypotheses of  relationships given the finite
number of  terminal taxa as the total explanatory space
of  the evidence at hand. Farris’ (1983) claim for
increased explanatory power is not based on the claim
that parsimony maximizes the number of  character
statements that can be explained as homologies. This
would mean to use the coherence of  character
statements as a guide to a positive (even though
provisional, defeasible, and probabilistic) knowledge
claim such as the one put forward by Nixon &
Carpenter (1996:237, emphasis added): “Simultaneous
analysis … produces the best-supported hypotheses…”
On Farris’ argument, explanatory power increases by
minimizing the number of  ad hoc hypotheses of
homoplasy (within the total explanatory space), not by
maximizing hypotheses of  homology. Coherence of
character statements cannot support, but incoherence
can undermine, hypotheses of  phylogeny. Taken to its
logical conclusion, Farris’ (1983) arguments remain
agnostic about the hypothesis of  relationships that is
compatible with maximal coherence of  character
statements. “Farris’ argument … is basically concerned
to point out what parsimonious cladograms do not say”
(Sober, 1985:213), or, in other words, Farris’ (1983)
argument is concerned with homoplasy, not with
homology (Wiesemüller et al., 2002). The concern is
with the ‘least falsified’ not with the ‘best supported’
hypothesis of  relationships. But that argument lacks
Popper’s asymmetry of  falsification (Rieppel, 2004c),
for the flip side of  Farris’ (1993) argument is to say
that maximal coherence of  character statements
provides support for hypotheses of  relationships
(Nixon & Carpenter, 1996), as Farris (1983:11) himself
pointed out: “… the decision [the choice amongst
competing hypotheses of  relationships] is made by
accepting the stronger body of  evidence over the
weaker, and ad hoc hypotheses of  homoplasy are
required to the extent that evidence must be dismissed
in order to defend the conclusion.”
CONCLUSIONS
At the end of  the day, Carnap (cited in Chisholm,
2000:111) conceded “those logical empiricists who
were attracted to the coherence theory of  truth tended
to lose sight of the … confrontation of a statement
with observation”. Coherent systems of  beliefs need
to be anchored in the world of  experience, if  they are
to contribute to the justification of empirical
knowledge claims. Coherent systems of  character
statements need to be anchored in the relevant causal
relations of  the physical world, if  they are to contribute
to the justification for finding one hypothesis of
relationships more likely than another one. The cau-
sal grounding of  character statements might be direct
(through the ‘evo-devo’ research program: Wagner,
2001), or indirect, such as through homology criteria
for morphology (believed to be defeasibly rooted in
causal relations of  inheritance and ontogeny at least
to some degree: Rieppel & Kearney, 2002). The
classical criteria of  homology (Remane, 1952) are those
of  topology and connectivity, and their rooting in
ontogeny results from the fact that due to causes of
inheritance, ‘developmental modules’ “occupy specific
physical sites within the embryo” and “exhibit varying
degrees of  connectivity to other modules within the
embryo” (Raff  & Sly, 2000:102). In molecular
systematics, secondary structure may provide guidance
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for the alignment of  mitochondrial gene sequences
(e.g., Kjer, 1995; Mindell et al., 1997; Olson & Yoder,
2002). A moderate foundationalism is required to make
empirical sciences work, one where the rooting of
coherent systems of  propositions is not deductive, but
probabilistic, and therefore defeasible (Audi,
2003:213).
The positivist philosopher Otto Neurath
pictured coherentism in a famous metaphor: he
compared empirical science to a raft that over time
has to be rebuilt plank by plank while it is out at sea.
For systematics this means that character statements
may need to be revised one by one while being put to
work in phylogeny reconstruction. Neurath’s metaphor
relates to a holistic view of  science known as the
‘Duhem-Quine-thesis’: the web of  scientific
knowledge is a web of  coherent statements. According
to Quine (2001a), any one of  these statements may at
any time be found to require revision, yet that revision
will have to take place without disruption of  the whole
web. The important thing to realize, however, is that
the impulse for such revision itself  will not be
generated by mere incoherence, but by the failure at
the margin of  that web of  statements to attach to the
world of  physical objects, their natural (i.e., causally
efficacious) properties and causal relations. Statements
near the center of  the web of  scientific knowledge
tend to include theoretical terms (that stand for
unobservables), such that coherence is of  prime
importance for their justification, but the
confrontation with the world becomes increasingly
more important as one approaches the margins of  the
web. It is at the edge of  the web of  scientific
knowledge where Quine (2000:290) finds science to
“line up for inspection,” i.e., to measure up “to the
perceptual network of  similarity” (see Dummett, 1993,
for a more sophisticated interpretation of  the
metaphor).
In systematic biology, statements of  homology
are theoretical statements on unobservables, for we
cannot observe similarity ‘due to common ancestry’
(Rieppel, 1992, 2004b). Coherence, therefore, is of
prime importance for statements of  homology. But
character statements that may or may not turn out as
statements of  homology must not only cohere in
support of  a phylogenetic hypothesis, they must also
be approximately aligned with causal relations (Boyd,
1999) that underlie biological structure. This is
perceptually achieved by the use of  established criteria
of  homology (Rieppel & Kearney, 2002), and causally
by heredity and developmental biology in its broadest
sense.
RESUMO
O teste de congruência baseado em evidência total, como é
usado na sistemática, foi atrelado à filosofia Popperiana de ciên-
cia, mas aqui se demonstra estar relacionado à teoria coerentista
da verdade na metafísica e a teoria do coerentismo na epistemologia.
Como o teste de congruência é coerentista, a base contextual (teó-
rica) da conceitualização inicial de caracteres não pode ser ignora-
da como sugerido por alguns proponentes da abordagem de evi-
dência total. Os méritos relativos apresentados pelas abordagens
de evidência total e de partição condicional do conjunto de dados
são considerados. Apesar das duas abordagens apresentarem seus
méritos e desvantagens, ambas necessitam de um embasamento
causal para definição dos caracteres (definição de homologia), ao
menos de forma aproximada e falseável. A conclusão é que a
congruência de caracteres representa uma condição necessária, mas
não suficiente para a reconstrução filogenética.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Sistemática, evidencia total, teste de
congruência, Popper.
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